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“Keep on Rockin’ in the Free World!” (Neil Young, 1989) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The year 1776 AD witnessed two landmark events in the history of the Free 
World. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain, a book by Scottish scholar 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) was published entitled An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. A main takeaway of this manuscript 
is that a decentralized free market system in which individuals solely pursue 
their self-interest may be more beneficial than a centralized system in 
which a few decide for the many. On the other side of the Atlantic, enemies 
of this Kingdom announced the Declaration of Independence, which marked 
the birth of the United States of America. Ever since the start, the free 
market philosophy such as set out in the Wealth of Nations has been part 
of this country’s DNA. 
                                                          
1 I acknowledge the valuable comments of Ivan Boldyrev, Johan Graafland and Eelke de Jong. This paper is 
written as part of the research project What Good Markets Are Good For and made possible through the 
support of a grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc.. The opinions expressed in this publication 
are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc.. 
2 Department of Organization & Strategy, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University. E-mail: 
i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl.   
2 
 
In spite of the widespread believe in the merits of the free market, it did 
not take long before U.S. legislators limited market participants’ freedom 
through the adoption of antitrust laws. First at the state level and since the 
late 1800s at the federal level, these rules of competition intended to 
combat particular business practices such as price-fixing and monopolizing 
conduct. After a somewhat hesitant start, competition policy quickly 
became a key factor in all kind of business transactions. The first national 
U.S. antitrust law (i.e., the Sherman Act) was even perceived as having 
near-constitutional status at some point. Chief Justice Hughes, for instance, 
wrote that:3  
“As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional 
provisions.” 
And in the early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:4 
 
“Antitrust laws in general and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of 
economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom 
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom 
to compete -- to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster.” 
 
Without questioning the impact and importance of competition policy, there 
is something inherently paradoxical about its presence in a free-market 
based society like the U.S.. After all, the free market tradition as it evolved 
through Scottish Enlightenment and British nineteenth century liberalism 
essentially identifies a trade-off between government and market. Simply 
put, more market means less government and vice versa. Proponents of 
                                                          
3 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
4 U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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this philosophy generally favour the market and advocate a laissez-faire 
policy. Yet, the development of U.S. competition policy unquestionably led 
to more government intervention and, although celebrated by many as an 
expression of freedom, therefore seems at odds with the free market 
philosophy.5    
 
The thesis of this paper is that competition policy is compatible with the 
free market philosophy, but only to the extent that it is essential for free 
market existence. More rather than less government intervention may be 
warranted when the free market would effectively disappear absent 
competition law enforcement. In that case, government and market are no 
longer communicating vessels; less government might no longer imply 
more market, but rather no market (in the sense proper) at all. 
 
There are basically two ways in which U.S. competition policy stimulates 
free market survival. First, it aims to preserve the free market institution 
by shaping market structure. Among other things, this includes lowering 
entry barriers and merger policy. Second, it aims to promote the free 
market spirit by enhancing the equality of opportunity. In particular, it 
supports small entrepreneurs and incentivizes businessmen to beat the 
competition by offering superior value propositions rather than through 
employing wasteful anticompetitive measures. Both make American 
competition policy consistent with the free market philosophy and 
consequently provide a moral justification for its presence.     
 
In the next section, we briefly describe the historical context within which 
U.S. competition policy emerged. Section 3 offers a rough overview of this 
policy and shows how it slowly but surely expanded. The main argument of 
how competition law enforcement fits within the free market tradition is 
developed in detail in Section 4 and Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
5 It is noteworthy that some free market scholars have defended competition law enforcement by comparing it 
to more intrusive forms of government intervention such as regulation and ownership.   
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2. Historical Context 
 
Let us begin by briefly sketching the historical context within which 
American competition policy emerged. The body of antitrust laws did not 
just fall from the sky. Rather, there were significant economic, social and 
political developments in the second half of the 19th century that formed a 
fertile soil for its creation. At the heart of it was the rise of big business, 
which was increasingly frowned upon, debated and even feared by 
economists, legislators and the American people.  
 
Around 1800 AD, the U.S. were already clearly developing as a nation. 
Market competition was, however, still mainly local and among small 
suppliers. Manufacturers typically controlled no more than 10% of their 
industry’s production, for example.6 Markets tend to work reasonably 
efficient in such an environment, because neither buyers nor suppliers 
possess the power to upset the price mechanism. It was the absence of two 
vital ingredients that prevented producers from growing into bigger 
enterprises. The first was monetary means to invest in large quantities of 
input to produce large quantities of output. The second was a significant 
level of demand for the product to make such an investment worthwhile. 
Both became increasingly available throughout the 19th century, which in 
turn enabled the rise of some of the most iconic American corporations 
(e.g., Standard Oil, General Motors, American Telephone & Telegraph).  
 
Regarding the first ingredient, substantial expansion investments came 
within reach primarily through the separation of ownership and control. At 
the time, it was common for owners to run their own business. And even 
though this ensures extensive control on daily operations, it also limits 
investment opportunities. By giving up (part of) the ownership through the 
issuing of stocks, monetary means could be generated in a relatively short 
                                                          
6 See Heilbroner and Milberg (2002, p. 87). 
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period. In turn, this made it possible to set-up large production facilities. 
But, what good is large-scale production when there are not enough 
customers to purchase the output?   
 
This brings us to the second ingredient, which became available primarily 
through the development of infrastructure. Both communication devices 
and means of transportation improved with an unprecedented speed. In 
1844, for instance, Samuel Morse succeeded in connecting Baltimore and 
Washington by telegraph. Just a few years later, cables linked New York to 
New Orleans and Chicago. Postal services developed in a similar fashion. 
Whereas U.S. Postal Service mainly used horses and coach to transport 
mail around 1830, railways were developing westward and quickly became 
a superior substitute. Flows of production were further facilitated through 
a network of waterways. Already in 1825, the famous Erie Canal became 
functional and many more canals were built in the ensuing decades. 
Together, these developments led to a rapid and substantial growth of 
markets as well as of some of the suppliers who now started to operate on 
a national scale.  
 
Next to this expansion of markets, there was growing social and political 
unrest. Not long after the ending of the Civil War (1861-1865), Americans 
witnessed the advent of what became known as the Long Depression. This 
period of downturn is considered to have started with the Great Panic of 
1873; a financial crisis that led to strikes and economic instability. The 
resulting downward drop in demand provided the newborn corporations 
with a strong and natural incentive to reduce their prices. A more profitable 
alternative to such a cutthroat strategy, however, was to restrict or even 
eliminate market competition. And this is precisely what happened. Indeed, 
the U.S. saw a rise in horizontal price-fixing agreements and large-scale 
mergers unequalled in its young history.7  
                                                          
7 It should be noted that there was quite some variety in the way in which industries transformed into centres 
of business power, including monopolization, cartels, pools and trusts. First introduced in the oil industry, a 
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Railroad companies, for instance, coordinated their actions to drive up 
prices.8 Perhaps the most telling example was the Standard Oil trust 
established by John D. Rockefeller, which the 27th U.S. president, William 
Howard Taft, once described as:9 
 
“…the greatest monopoly and combination in restraint of trade in the 
world,…an octopus that held the trade in its tentacles, and the few actual 
independent concerns that kept alive were allowed to exist by sufferance 
merely to maintain an appearance of competition…”  
 
One consequence of these anti-competitive business practices was that a 
substantial amount of wealth ended up in the hand of a few. This, in turn, 
fuelled public opinion against the fast emergence of big business and trusts. 
These anti-bigness sentiments combined with the fear for concentrations of 
market power was at the heart of the development of the first antitrust 
laws. Towards the end of the 19th century, many considered the significant 
consolidation of industry and the emergence of powerful business 
combinations a severe threat.10 In fact, some politicians vividly argued that 
this perceived danger could not be ignored. Indeed, it was Senator John 
Sherman from Ohio who stated that:11      
 
“You must heed their [the voters] appeal or be ready for the socialist, 
communist, and the nihilist,”  
 
thereby paving the way for U.S. competition policy. 
                                                          
trust was a (at the time) legal form of business organization where participants gave up control over their 
companies in exchange for a fixed share of profits generated by the trust.  
8 The emergence of powerful trusts was widespread. As Heilbroner and Milberg (2002, p. 86) state: “It was not 
just the railroad industry that used economic power to create a monopoly position. In whiskey and sugar, in 
tobacco and cattle feed, in wire nails, steel hoops, electrical appliances, tinplate, in matches and meat, there 
was an octopus similar…”. 
9 Taft, the Anti-Trust Acts and the Supreme Court (1914), cited in Orbach and Sokol (2013).  
10 George Gunton, a known defender of trusts at the time, stated that the situation was “surcharged with an 
indefinite but almost inexpressible fear of trusts.” See Stocking and Watkins (1951).   
11 See Thorelli (1955). 
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3. U.S. Competition Policy 
 
Though certainly not the first collection of competition rules in history, 
competition law enforcement is widely acknowledged to have been born 
with the passage of Bill S. I in the U.S. on July 2, 1890.12 Today, this bill is 
known as the Sherman Act, named after Senator Sherman who proposed 
it at the 51st Congress and who at the time appeared one of the most 
articulate spokespersons on the subject. Together with the Clayton Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914, this law still forms the 
foundation of today’s U.S. federal competition policy. 
 
The Sherman Act has two substantive sections: 
 
Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make 
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared 
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony…  
 
Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony… 
 
As noted by many, the wording in both provisions is fairly vague and 
flexible. Consequently, the actual meaning of concepts like “conspiracy”, 
“restraint of trade” and “(attempt to) monopolize” had to be determined in 
concrete court cases.13  
 
                                                          
12 Quite a few states already adopted competition laws prior to 1890 as did Canada in 1889. See, for example, 
Stigler (1985).   
13 Not surprisingly, the broad formulation also laid the basis for extensive discussions about the (intended) 
goals of antitrust. Some scholars have advocated that the sole intent was to maximize allocative efficiency 
(e.g., Bork (1978)). The more popular view is that Congress and courts aimed at promoting a combination of 
values, including the protection of small businesses and consumers (e.g., Schwartz (1979), Lande (1982) and 
Stigler (1985)). 
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In their search for sound judicial interpretations, some judges turned to 
common law from the pre-Sherman Act period.14 Although no directly 
comparable common law principles existed, useful elements could be found 
in ancient private and criminal doctrines. Cases concerning restraints of 
trade were, for instance, commonly dealt with under contract law. 
Interestingly, several of these cases already revealed clear anti-monopoly 
sentiments as the next quote illustrates.15 
 
“The clear tendency of such an agreement is to establish a monopoly, and 
to destroy competition in trade, and for that reason, on grounds of public 
policy, courts will not aid in its enforcement.”       
 
In fact, this statement reflects the overall common law stance on 
anticompetitive combinations such as cartels; they were typically tolerated, 
but not legally enforceable. 
 
During the decades after the passage of the Sherman Act, legal discussions 
mainly revolved around the question whether challenged business practices 
should be subject to a reasonableness test or be declared illegal per se. 
Under a rule-of-reason standard, the court balances adverse and beneficial 
effects of a particular business act in order to judge its legality. It was this 
approach that was explicitly embraced as the standard in two cases in 
1911.16 However, it did not take long before the Supreme Court established 
a per se prohibition for fixing prices.17 Over time, the scope of the per se 
rule has widened and an increasing number of business practices (e.g., 
market division, customer allocation, group boycotts) are held illegal 
independent of their actual effect on the market. 
                                                          
14 Hylton (2003) provides an extensive discussion of the relation between the antitrust acts and the common 
law.  
15 Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880). For similar examples, see Thorelli (1955) and Kintner 
(1980). 
16 These cases are: Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 
221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
17 This happened primarily through two case decisions: U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Company et al. 273 U.S. 392 
(1927) and U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
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Pleas by defendants and prominent economists on the potential beneficial 
effects of combinations increasingly fell on deaf ears, therefore. Cartels, for 
example, were recurrently referred to as “children of distress” that ensured 
order and stability, particularly during economic downturns.18 The central 
argument was that in the presence of high fixed and low variable costs, 
excess production capacity would trigger ruinous competition resulting in 
bankruptcies and unemployment. Cartels were considered a natural way 
out of such slumps. Not long after the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
however, the Supreme Court reconfirmed the per se approach towards 
price-fixing by reasoning that:19         
 
“Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price-cutting, and the like 
appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If 
the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the 
reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-
fixing case. In that event, the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its 
philosophy would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system 
of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which its framers 
intended.” 
 
Apart from these developments in the courtroom, two companion laws were 
enacted in 1914; the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. The Clayton Act prohibits 
a number of specific business practices such as price discrimination, tying 
and exclusive dealing contracts. Moreover, its Section 7 prohibits mergers 
to the extent that its effect would be to substantially lessen competition. 
The key provision of the FTC Act, Section 5, declares unlawful unfair 
methods of competition.  
 
                                                          
18 Kleinwächter (2017) coined the phrase “Kartelle sind Kinder der Not” (“Cartels are Children of Distress”) as 
far back as 1883. A general discussion on cutthroat competition can be found in Scherer (1980, pp. 212-216).   
19 U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
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Similar to the Sherman Act, however, these laws were not very effective at 
first. Congress attempted to address this problem through the adoption of 
various amendments in the ensuing decades. It, for example, passed the 
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. This law substantially amended the Clayton 
Act by making it applicable to a wider class of business situations and by 
enhancing enforcement possibilities. In particular, this act aimed to protect 
small businesses by countering the advantageous market position of big 
enterprises somewhat. Large firms can, for example, often buy their inputs 
in bulk and negotiate a quantity discount. As such discounts are typically 
not available to small buyers, this type of price discrimination might have 
the effect to substantially lessen competition and thus be prohibited.       
 
With the passage of the Clayton Act and the FTC Act, U.S. competition law 
enforcement changed from a primarily reactive to a more proactive policy; 
a trend fuelled by several amendments like the Robinson-Patman Act 
throughout the 20th century. This point can be illustrated with an example 
on merger policy.  
 
In principle, a merger could be challenged under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act in case it violated some monopolization standard. Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act went a significant step further by installing an incipiency 
standard. It intended to “arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and 
monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation”.20 Hence, it 
enabled antitrust intervention at a point where potential harmful effects of 
the merger were not yet manifest. Congress went yet another step further 
with the enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
in 1976. Among other things, this set of amendments contains premerger 
notification provisions. Prior to a merger (or acquisition), parties involved 
are required to file a notification with the Federal Trade Commission and 
                                                          
20 Senate Report 698, 15.657, 63rd Cong., second session, 1914, p.1. The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 
strengthened the incipiency standard and broadened the scope of the Clayton Act by making it applicable to 
asset acquisition cases and mergers between firms that are no direct competitors. A detailed description can 
be found in Scherer (1980).  
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the U.S. Department of Justice. These agencies then scrutinize the 
proposed transaction and assess its potential (anti-)competitive effects. 
Depending on the findings, the proposed merger may then be approved or 
challenged instead. 
 
During the past few decades, the most prominent changes took place in 
enforcement policy and the courtroom. An amnesty program has been 
installed, for instance, which induces firms involved in competition law 
violations to self-report in exchange for a reduction of the antitrust penalty. 
The role of economic analysis in competition cases has grown substantially 
and facilitated in the development of this program as well as in the 
estimation of antitrust damages. This arguably led to a more severe 
enforcement of U.S. competition laws, both in terms of total corporate fines 
collected and years of imprisonment.21        
 
 
4. Preservation of the Free Market Institution 
 
The above description of U.S. competition policy development sketches a 
picture of (directly and indirectly) increasing government intervention. 
Anticompetitive agreements between firms were often tolerated under 19th 
century common law, but generally not legally enforceable. This ended with 
the passage of the Sherman Act, which made illegal particular monopolizing 
business practices. A few decades later, its companion laws introduced an 
incipiency standard and declared unlawful unfair methods of competition. 
Further restrictions on market transactions were imposed throughout the 
20th century and merger policy became tighter overall.22  
 
                                                          
21 A detailed empirical analysis and discussion of recent trends in U.S. competition law enforcement is 
provided by Ghosal and Sokol (2014).    
22 It should be noted that this trend was non-monotonic. For example, merger control became temporarily less 
strict under the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s as it was viewed an unnecessary form of 
government intervention.    
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This expanding set of restraints seems fundamentally at odds with the free-
market philosophy. Not only did it limit the liberty of market participants, 
but it also led to a larger rather than a smaller government. As we will 
argue in the following, however, competition policy is compatible with the 
free market tradition if one considers it a prerequisite for the preservation 
of the free market institution.    
 
To begin, let us clarify what we mean when we qualify the market as free. 
It is clear that one can approach this issue in many ways, but we believe 
the following simple perspective is sufficient to facilitate the discussion. 
Imagine a remote village with a single representative market place where 
merchants offer their products to potential buyers. When would we consider 
such a market to be (non-)free? The following stylized figure sheds light on 
this question.    
 
 
        Demand Barriers      
 
 
 
Supply Barriers 
High Low 
High Non-Free Demand Free 
Low Supply Free Free 
 
 
 
 
 
A market is a, potentially abstract, place where buyers and sellers interact 
and Figure 1 combines this in one particular fashion. The rows represent 
the supply side and the columns capture the demand side. Starting with 
Figure 1: Stylized Model of a 
(Non-)Free Market Definition. 
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the supply side, a distinction is made between high and low entry barriers. 
These barriers are considered high when it is prohibitively costly for 
newcomers with a competitive value proposition to enter the market. They 
are considered low when these potential entrants find it profitable to access 
this market through setting-up their own stands. The demand side in some 
sense mirrors the supply side perspective by distinguishing between high 
and low exit barriers. Exit barriers are considered high when actual buyers 
lack a reasonable alternative, which may be reflected by a low demand 
elasticity and a high willingness to pay. Instead, these barriers are low 
when buyers face attractive outside options.  
 
This approach identifies four possible scenarios. One case is when both 
entry and exit barriers are low. This is characteristic of a free market. In 
this situation, entrepreneurs do not encounter unnatural barriers when 
pursuing new business opportunities in this market. Likewise, customers 
face no difficulties in leaving this market when confronted with suboptimal 
value propositions. A market can also be semi-free. It is supply free when 
entry barriers are low and buyers lack attractive outside options.23 If the 
opposite holds, then the market is demand free. The market is non-free 
when both barriers are high. Firms willing to enter such a market face 
severe obstacles, whereas consumers have no reasonable alternative.       
 
It is clear that actual markets may vary in their degree of entry and exit 
barriers and therefore in the extent to which they are supply or demand 
free. Moreover, one should bear in mind that both entry and exit barriers 
may be in part endogenous. Markets that are initially free might through 
time transform into semi-free or non-free ones. If a few free-market firms 
become dominant, for instance, they may successfully adopt lobbying 
                                                          
23 Blake and Jones (1965, pp. 383-384) explicitly formulate the desirability of supply free markets as follows: 
“The individual who wants to be an entrepreneur rather than an employee ought not to have his opportunities 
restricted by unnecessary barriers to entry, or by trade practices designed specifically to eliminate him from the 
field.”   
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tactics or entry deterring strategies.24 Similarly, exit barriers may be raised 
over time. Buyers might, for example, experience switching costs after 
getting used to existing products. Also, they may sign long-term contracts 
that strongly attach them to incumbent suppliers.  
 
In terms of concentrations of economic power and market performance, 
however, there is no reason to consider free and semi-free markets 
problematic. After all, under such market conditions supra-competitive 
profits cannot be sustained for long. In supply free markets, for example, 
above normal industry performance would attract newcomers, which in turn 
would create a downward pressure on prices and profits. In demand free 
markets, incumbents are naturally constrained by the attractive outside 
options of their customers. This too precludes excessive profits and abuse. 
This is not to say that market performance will be poor in non-free 
concentrated markets. In fact, it is well-known that perfectly competitive 
outcomes may emerge even in isolated price-setting duopolies.25 High 
entry and exit barriers are therefore a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for high market power and poor market performance.  
 
If even non-free markets may de facto function as free ones, then how can 
we reconcile the presence of competition policy with the free market 
philosophy? One answer lies in the fear that absent rules of competition the 
free market would effectively disappear. This fear is understandable when 
two conditions hold. First, it must be considered likely that non-free 
markets emerge on a large scale. It is noteworthy that this fear was 
reflected recurrently in U.S. antitrust history. For example, in 1889 Senator 
Jones and Turpie respectively stated that:26 
                                                          
24 Concentrations of power were indeed not only thought to threaten individual well-being, but also the 
political process. See, for instance, Millon (1988) who writes on balance of power in relation to the Sherman 
Act and states that: “Economic power meant political power because wealth provided the means to create 
dependence and thereby collect political influence.”   
25 This result is, however, commonly referred to as the Bertrand paradox, see Tirole (1988).  
26 See 20 Cong. Record 1457 and 21 Cong. Record 137. Bold emphasis is ours.  
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“…These commercial monsters called trusts…[are] preying upon every 
industry, and by their unholy combinations robbing their victims, the 
general public…” 
 
And 
 
“…The conspirators of the trust…are hunting the prey, dividing the spoil in 
every market…”  
  
Second, non-free markets must be viewed as breeding grounds for 
enduring concentrations of power, which in turn would severely limit the 
freedom of (a substantial part of) businesses and consumers. This belief 
was also widespread. In fact, it was John Sherman himself who once 
formulated it as follows:27   
“…If the concentered powers of this combination are intrusted to a single 
man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, 
and should be subject to the strong resistance of the State and national 
authorities. If anything is wrong this is wrong. If we will not endure a king 
as a political power we should not endure a king over the production, 
transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we would not 
submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with 
power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity…”  
 
And in the famous Alcoa antitrust case, Judge Hand referred to another 
observation by Sherman:28 
 
“…The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, 
and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of 
condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single 
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to 
control production and trade and to break down competition. These 
combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corporations 
and reach State authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms to every 
part of our country. They are imported from abroad. Congress alone can 
deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust 
for every production and a master to fix the price for every necessity of 
life…” 
                                                          
27 See 21 Cong. Record 2457.  
28 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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Of course, this is not to say that these expressed fears were justified. 
Although market concentration was increasing rapidly in many industries, 
one might argue that even after the rise of the corporation most markets 
were still (semi-) free in the sense defined above.29 Rather, the point is that 
the presence of competition law enforcement is compatible with a free 
market system if one considers it essential to its existence.      
 
 
5. Promotion of the Free Market Spirit 
 
The approach of U.S. competition policy to preserve the free market 
institution has been to prohibit particular anticompetitive business practices 
and to shape industry structures (e.g., through merger policy). This, one 
may argue, is its direct effect; the creation of a context within which 
individuals and firms are free to pursue their own best interests. Yet, these 
competition rules arguably not only affect the stage on which the game is 
played, but also the players themselves. In particular, they not just face 
protection from anticompetitive measures by rivals, but are simultaneously 
incentivized to behave more competitively. It is this indirect effect of U.S. 
competition policy that we now turn to.     
 
There are at least two ways through which U.S. competition policy 
stimulates the free market spirit. The first is due to the idea that freedom 
requires balance of power. More specifically, one of the main merits of a 
decentralized market system is that none has the power to dominate 
others. This, in turn, is considered to safeguard freedom for all. The free 
market philosophy is thus in some sense more about equality than about 
freedom; it is the equality of condition and opportunity that is thought to 
                                                          
29 In reflecting on the American industry composition in the second half of the 19th century, Stigler (1985) 
remarks: “The average business is not capable of achieving effective cartelization or monopoly, simply because 
the small relative size of an efficient enterprise and the absence of entry barriers make such goals 
unattainable.”  
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ensure freedom for American citizens and undertakings.30 And it is precisely 
this equality that was threatened by the emergence of the giant 
corporations and trusts.  
    
It is then not surprising that the rise of oligarchs as well as a dominant 
managerial class was met with great suspicion.31 There was (and, in fact, 
still is) strong sympathy for the small business owner who attempts to 
make a living through hard work and dedication. This widespread sympathy 
is also reflected in U.S. competition policy. For instance, Judge Hand once 
reasoned that:32 
 
“Be that as it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it did not 
condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it forbad all. Moreover, in 
so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is 
possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of 
small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and 
character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept 
the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have suggested only 
as possible purposes of the [Sherman] Act, we think the decisions prove to 
have been in fact its purposes.” 
 
One major risk of a severely unbalanced allocation of economic power is 
that those who find themselves with a lack of it may be discouraged to 
compete and challenge the establishment. The significant increase of 
market concentration in many industries was indeed thought to deprive 
ambitious Americans of the opportunity for prosperity.33 One of Congress’ 
                                                          
30 As Alexis de Tocqueville stated in his Democracy in America: “I think that democratic communities have a 
natural taste for freedom; left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it and view any privation of it with regret. 
But for equality their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom…”   
31 As observed by Lande (1982): “Decisionmaking was transferred from traditional power centers to the great 
industrialists. Self-reliant farmers, business owners, and local leaders became dependent on the discretionary 
power of a few very rich men. Local control of society ended as numerous small power centers were swept away 
by the new class, one perceived as greedy and evil.” 
32 U.S. vs. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In the same case, it is stated that: 
“Throughout the history of these statutes [the antitrust laws] it has been constantly assumed that one of their 
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization in 
small units which can effectively compete with each other.” 
33 See, for example, Millon (1988).  
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goals was therefore to restore the balance of power somewhat and to 
encourage small businesses by establishing a playground on which they 
have a fair chance of success.34  
 
This is not to say that anything goes within the boundaries of U.S. 
competition policy, however. In fact, one of the prime benefits of 
maintaining a free competitive order is considered to be its presumed 
disciplinary value. Within such a setting, rewards come to those who seek 
and grasp the opportunities given to them. To be effective in such an 
environment then requires a certain character. Hofstadter formulated this 
as follows:35 
“America was thought to have been made possible by the particular type 
of character that was forged by competitive individualism, a type that had 
flourished in the United States because competitive opportunities had been 
so widespread that alert men could hardly fail to see them, to grasp and 
use them, and hence, to be shaped by them.” 
 
The merits of a decentralized free market system were frequently argued 
to surpass mere economic considerations. A competitive order in which 
each is offered a fair chance of prosperity imposes discipline and 
incentivizes all to embrace those values consistent with a free market 
economy. Small entrepreneurs who constantly seek to improve their 
situation are thought to stimulate “expression of the fundamental virtues 
of thrift, industry, intelligence, schooling, home ties, and family pride”.36    
In turn, these values enable free-market based societies to flourish as a 
whole. For example, to reap the gains from trade requires men to 
sufficiently control their emotions and passions. A working free market 
system can therefore be argued to contribute to a safe society.37 Moreover, 
                                                          
34 See Lande (1982). 
35 Hofstadter (1965).  
36 The Small Business Committee of the Senate, cited in Bunzel (1962). 
37 The French scholar Charles Montesquieu is claimed to have said: “… it is almost a general rule that wherever 
the ways of man are gentle (moeurs douces), there is commerce; and wherever there is commerce, there the 
ways of man are gentle,” and “Commerce… polishes and softens (adoucit) barbarian ways as we can see every 
day…” See Hirschman (1977). 
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since one is considered primarily responsible for one’s self and relatives, 
there is a strong sense of community building. Indeed, absent a 
paternalistic government, individuals quite naturally rely on those around 
them and who find themselves in a similar position.38 This creates mutual 
sympathy and social stability provided that everyone is given a fair chance 
to get ahead. The latter imposes a limit on inequality. In particular, losers 
in the free market should not lose too much as that is likely to create social 
costs as reflected by limited education and increasing crime rates.39  
 
U.S. competition policy can thus be said to enhance the free market spirit 
in two ways. On the one hand, it offers small business owners a carrot by 
striving for a sufficiently balanced and fair playground. That is, a self-
reliant, hard-working and efficient businessman should have a fair chance 
of reaping the fruits of his efforts. On the other hand, by protecting and 
stimulating the competitive process, it provides a stick to discipline all 
industry members. To be effective within a free market environment, hard 
work and efficiency are arguably less of a choice and more of a necessity. 
Indeed, a competitive market mechanism is ultimately the strictest 
taskmaster of all so that:40 
 
“Economic freedom is more illusory than it appears. You may do as you 
please, but if you please to do that which the market disapproves, the price 
of freedom is ruin.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 For the U.S., this is described in detail by De Tocqueville (1998). 
39 For a detailed discussion, see Baker and Salop (2015) and the references therein.  
40 See Heilbroner (2000) and Heilbroner and Milberg (2002). 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Few today would doubt the need for competition rules in a free, marked-
based society like the United States of America. From a free market 
philosophy perspective, however, there is something inherently paradoxical 
about the presence of competition policy. After all, the competition laws 
that are intended to combat restraints of trade are, in fact, themselves 
restraints of trade. In this paper, we have argued that competition policy 
is compatible with the free market philosophy if the free market system 
would effectively disappear without it and shown that this possibility was 
considered real in the history of U.S. competition law enforcement. 
 
At the heart is the idea that freedom is best preserved when no one is in 
the position to dominate others. Taking this perspective, the emergence of 
trusts and large corporations implied a reduction of freedom for both 
American citizens and firms. This freedom is, in the words of John Stuart 
Mill, “that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not 
attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it”.41 A 
free market rationale for U.S. competition policy is that those with market 
power cannot be trusted to abide by this principle.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Mill (2003). 
21 
 
References 
Baker, Jonathan B. and Steven C. Salop (2015), “Antitrust, Competition 
Policy, and Inequality,” Georgetown law Journal, 104(1), 1-28; 
Blake, H. and K. Jones (1965), “The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on 
Policy,” Columbia Law Review, 65(3), 377-400;  
Bork, R.H. (1978), “The Antitrust Paradox: Policy at War with Itself,” Basic 
Books, New York; 
Bunzel, J.H. (1962), “The American Small Businessman,” Alfred A. Knopf, 
New York; 
De Tocqueville, A. (1998), “Democracy in America,” Wordsworth Classics 
of World Literature, London; 
Ghosal, Vivek and Daniel D. Sokol (2014), “The Evolution of U.S. Cartel 
Enforcement,” Journal of Law and Economics, 57(3), 51-65; 
Heilbroner, R.L. (2000), “The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and 
Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers,” (revised 7th edition), Penguin 
Books, London; 
Heilbroner, R.L. and W. Milberg (2002), “The Making of Economic Society,” 
11th edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey;  
Hirschman, Albert O. (1977), “The Passions and the Interests: Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph,” Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey; 
Hylton, K.N. (2003), “Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law 
Evolution,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
Kitner, E.W. (1980), “Federal Antitrust Law, Volume 1: Economic Theory, 
Common Law, and the Introduction of the Sherman Act,” Cincinnati: 
Anderson Publishing Co.;  
Kleinwächter, F. (2017), “Die Kartelle. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der 
Organisation der Volkswirtschaft,” London: Forgotten Books; 
Lande, R.H. (1982), “Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern 
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,” Hastings Law 
Journal, 34, 65-151;  
Mill, J.S. (2003), “On Liberty,” Yale University Press, New Haven; 
22 
 
Millon, D.K. (1988), “The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power,” Southern 
California Law Review, 61, 1219-1292; 
Orbach, B. and D.D. Sokol (2013), “Symposium: 100 years of Standard Oil: 
Antitrust Energy,” Southern California Law Review, 85(3), 429-450;  
Scherer, F.M. (1980), “Industrial market structure and economic 
performance,” 2nd edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston; 
Schwarz, L.B. (1979), “Justice and other non-economic goals of antitrust,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127, 1076-1081; 
Smith, A. (1977), “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations,” Edwin Cannan (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago; 
Stigler, G.J. (1985), “The Origin of the Sherman Act,” Journal of Legal 
Studies, 14, 1-12; 
Stocking, G.W. and M.W. Watkins (1951), “Monopoly and Free Enterprise,” 
The Twentieth Century Fund, New York; 
Thorelli, H.B. (1955), “The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origin of an American 
Tradition,” Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; 
Tirole, J. (1988), “The Theory of Industrial Organization,” MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA.    
 
Law Cases 
 
Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880); 
 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911); 
 
U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); 
 
U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Company et al. 273 U.S. 392 (1927); 
 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344 (1933); 
 
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); 
U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); 
U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).  
